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“New policy designs will need to have an explicit dual purpose, combining the 
objectives of labor migration and humanitarian protection.”
Most high-income countries make a strict distinction in their immigration poli-cies between refugees and those deemed 
to be labor migrants. While refugees are typically 
admitted on humanitarian grounds—albeit with 
debates in many countries about who qualifies 
and what degree of protection they are entitled 
to receive—labor migrants are usually admitted 
with the explicit aim of benefiting the economy 
and society. The Global Compact on Refugees, a 
new nonbinding United Nations framework for 
improved global governance and more equitable 
sharing of responsibility, recommends that high-
income countries take in some refugees as labor 
migrants. Is this a good idea? Could it work?
How to help the rapidly growing number of 
refugees in the world is among the greatest moral 
and political challenges of our time. According to 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
there are now over 25 million recognized refugees, 
the highest number on record. The vast majority, 
about 85 percent, have taken refuge in relatively 
low-income countries. The top 10 hosts in 2017 
included four of the world’s least developed coun-
tries—Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh—
and five middle-income countries: Pakistan, Leba-
non, Iran, Jordan, and Turkey (the world’s leading 
host, with 3.5 million refugees).
Only one high-income country—Germany, 
hosting one million refugees—made the top 10. 
When refugees are considered as a share of the do-
mestic population, Sweden is the only high-income 
country among the top 10 hosting nations, with 24 
refugees per 1,000 people, compared with 43 per 
1,000 in Turkey, 71 per 1,000 in Jordan, and 164 
per 1,000 in Lebanon.
Why is the global distribution of refugees so 
heavily skewed toward lower-income countries? 
The first reason is straightforward: the great major-
ity of the world’s refugees came from low-income 
countries and fled to neighboring or other nearby 
low- or middle-income countries. As of 2017, over 
two-thirds of refugees originated from just five 
low-income countries—Syria, Afghanistan, South 
Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia—and most have 
found “safe havens” in nearby countries.
The second reason has to do with the politics of 
immigration in rich countries: most do not offer 
opportunities for people to travel legally to their 
territories in order to apply for asylum. Forced 
migrants who wish to apply for asylum in high-
income countries must do so by engaging in irreg-
ular migration—defined here as the unauthorized 
crossing of national borders—which often involves 
long and dangerous journeys across land and sea. 
Many rich countries have stepped up their efforts 
to reduce illegal border crossings over the past few 
decades, especially since the large increases in the 
numbers of Syrian and other migrants arriving in 
Europe and claiming asylum in 2015 and 2016. 
With few exceptions, most rich countries also 
have long been reluctant to offer resettlement for 
large numbers of recognized refugees who have 
found protection in “first countries of asylum” in 
or near conflict regions.
The United States has traditionally been the 
country that accepts by far the largest number of 
resettled refugees—those whose status has been 
determined by UNHCR and are transferred from a 
country of first asylum to another country that has 
agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them 
permission to stay permanently. However, the 
US intake has dropped significantly of late. The 
Trump administration announced in late 2017 
that it would reduce the annual cap on resettle-
ment to 45,000 per year, less than half the 110,000 
cap set during the final year of the Obama admin-
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istration. (In September 2018, the Trump admin-
istration announced a further reduction in the cap, 
to 30,000—the lowest since the program began in 
1980.)
Several other high-income countries have 
also reduced their resettlement numbers in re-
cent years; some, such as Austria and Denmark, 
have suspended resettlement altogether. In 2017, 
only 102,800 refugees were resettled worldwide, 
a reduction of nearly 50 percent from 2016, and 
equivalent to only about 0.5 percent of the global 
refugee population.
NARROW PATHS
The highly unequal distribution of refugees 
across the world and the shrinking of the already 
limited legal pathways to protection in rich coun-
tries have led to calls for alternatives. One idea 
that has been around for a while, and has gained 
prominence in recent years, is to encourage high-
income countries to use labor immigration poli-
cies to admit refugees.
The Global Compact on Ref-
ugees recommends “comple-
mentary pathways” to resettle-
ment such as “labor mobility” 
opportunities for refugees. This 
is meant to contribute to the 
compact’s overall aims, which 
include enhancing refugees’ 
self-reliance, easing the pressures on host coun-
tries in low-income regions, and promoting condi-
tions in countries of origin that will allow for the 
safe return of refugees.
Most labor migrants in high-income countries 
enter through programs that grant temporary 
residence status on arrival, though some allow an 
eventual transition to permanent status. Most of 
the programs target migrants with particular skills, 
and treat higher- and lower-skilled workers differ-
ently. Programs for higher-skilled migrant work-
ers generally place fewer restrictions on admission 
and grant migrants more rights, especially for wel-
fare, residency, and family reunion, than programs 
targeting lower-skilled migrants.
The most common policy tools employed to 
regulate the admission of labor migrants in high-
income countries include quotas and the require-
ment of a job offer before admission. Temporary 
labor migration programs typically limit work-
permit holders’ employment to specific occupa-
tions or sectors, and require migrants to prove that 
they will not rely on public assistance to support 
themselves or their families. They also usually re-
quire employers to advertise vacancies in the do-
mestic labor market for a minimum period before 
they can apply for a work permit to use to recruit 
a migrant worker.
Debates on labor immigration among the pub-
lic and policy makers vary across countries but 
proposals for dealing with the issue are typically 
framed in highly consequentialist terms. In oth-
er words, they are based on the perceived or real 
costs and benefits of particular admission poli-
cies for the existing residents of the host country, 
without significant consideration of the interests 
of new migrants or their countries of origin. Hu-
manitarian considerations typically play no role 
in the labor immigration policies of high-income 
countries.
Realistically, that means an alternative labor mi-
gration pathway for refugees cannot be designed 
purely on humanitarian grounds. This would es-
sentially amount to expanding humanitarian re-
settlement, which many high-income countries 
are reluctant to do. The key 
question then is whether an al-
ternative pathway for refugees 
should be based on labor immi-
gration policy objectives alone, 
which would subject refugees 
to the same criteria used for 
regulating the admission of mi-
grant workers, or whether a new approach should 
have a humanitarian element.
In my view, policies that explicitly include a 
mix of both labor immigration and humanitarian 
objectives will have the best chance of winning ap-
proval and benefiting the largest number of refu-
gees. For one thing, if refugees are admitted un-
der the umbrella of a labor immigration program 
and there is an explicit recognition that the policy 
includes a humanitarian component, it should be 
easier to justify exemptions from some admission 
requirements that apply to other labor migrants. 
Treating refugees purely as labor migrants with-
out any recognition of their special status will not 
benefit many for the simple reason that refugees 
would need to compete for admission with other 
migrants from all around the world. So a more ef-
fective approach would be to design a program 
that is based, as much as possible, on the key fea-
tures of labor immigration policies but also in-
cludes special measures for refugees.
Such a mixed policy would be similar, in terms 
of combining different objectives, to seasonal mi-
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grant worker programs introduced in New Zealand 
in 2007 and in Australia the next year for migrants 
from islands in the South Pacific. These policies 
have an explicit dual objective: to help fill labor 
shortages in the host countries while promoting 
development in the migrants’ countries of origin. 
Of course, any mixed-objectives policy would still 
require a determination of exactly how much pref-
erence to give to refugees over other migrants, an 
especially thorny question if the overall number to 
be admitted is limited.
In principle, there are three broad policy ap-
proaches for using labor immigration pathways 
to admit refugees to high-income countries. One 
aims to help refugees gain access to existing labor 
immigration programs without making any poli-
cy adjustments for “refugee-workers.” Another 
aims to create incentives for employers to recruit 
refugee-workers within the broad parameters of 
existing labor immigration policies. A third ap-
proach seeks to establish new labor immigration 
programs exclusively for refugee-workers.
CLEARING HURDLES
Although bilateral migration deals are increas-
ingly common, most labor immigration programs 
enacted by high-income countries apply to mi-
grants from any country. Employers are already 
able to recruit refugee-workers through these 
existing programs. In practice, they will only do 
so if refugees are the most skilled and suitable 
candidates for the job. Factors that weigh on this 
judgment, along with candidates’ skills and work 
experience, include the costs associated with re-
cruitment and any training that may be necessary. 
Under almost all such programs it is the employer 
rather than the migrant worker who applies for 
the work permit, so considering employers’ needs 
is of central importance.
Refugee-workers will be competing with mi-
grant workers from around the world. In this com-
petition, refugees who have escaped conflicts will 
be at a distinct disadvantage. They will lack in-
formation about the labor immigration programs 
of high-income countries, and employers and re-
cruitment agencies are unlikely to be informed 
about potential refugee-workers. Various types 
of information portals accessible to both refugees 
and employers that could help match employer 
demands with refugee skills would help bridge 
that knowledge gap.
Requirements for papers such as travel docu-
ments, proof of identity, and skills certifications 
present a second set of hurdles for refugees. Forced 
migrants who have escaped from conflict zones 
are much less likely to have the necessary paper-
work. Specific policies would be needed to lower 
these barriers. Relevant international organiza-
tions could be asked to help. For example, UNHCR 
could assist with documenting the identity of refu-
gees; another suitable organization could be asked 
to find ways to certify their skills and experience.
The costs of migration, including visa fees, pres-
ent yet another challenge for refugees. For many 
(but not all) displaced people, the costs of legal 
migration may be prohibitive, yet they are still 
lower than the costs and risks associated with pay-
ing smugglers to guide them through illegal bor-
der crossings. There may be a number of ways to 
lower the costs of legal entry. High-income coun-
tries could waive or reduce visa fees; nongovern-
mental organizations could help migrants defray 
travel costs.
Even if some of these hurdles could be eliminat-
ed, employers may still prefer to recruit migrant 
workers rather than refugees. The small numbers 
of refugees who would benefit are likely to be the 
most highly skilled and those with the most finan-
cial resources, since the current labor immigration 
policies of high-income countries are much more 
open to admitting higher-skilled migrants.
EMPLOYER INCENTIVES
A second policy option is to go beyond the pro-
vision of better information and links between em-
ployers and refugees by taking measures that are 
explicitly aimed at generating employer demand 
for refugee-workers, within the broad parameters 
of existing labor immigration policies. Such poli-
cies could be modified to encourage the recruit-
ment of refugee-workers in addition to migrant 
workers, which could increase the total intake of 
migrants. Or more refugee-workers could be ad-
mitted in lieu of some migrant workers, keeping 
overall numbers flat. If annual quotas are used to 
regulate labor immigration, a limited number of 
places could be reserved for refugee-workers with-
in an existing quota—an option that might find 
favor with politicians wary of any plan that would 
increase overall migrant numbers.
Where an increase in the quota would be con-
sidered undesirable or where quotas are not used, 
other relatively small adjustments could give 
employers incentives to recruit refugee-workers 
within the broad framework of existing policies. 
But some rules would be hard to change, particu-
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larly those, like job-offer requirements and occu-
pational restrictions, at the core of a demand-led 
immigration policy intended to admit migrants for 
specific jobs or occupations. In European Union 
countries, many vacancies for low-skilled jobs, 
which otherwise might be available for refugee-
workers, are instead filled by migrants from other 
EU member countries who have the right to unre-
stricted labor mobility within the union.
The labor-market test requirement, whereby em-
ployers must advertise a job locally before recruit-
ing a migrant to fill it, is an example of a demand-
side restriction that could be relaxed to encourage 
employer demand for refugee-workers. It has not 
been particularly effective at protecting domestic 
workers’ employment prospects anyway; it merely 
delays recruitment of migrants. One option would 
be to waive the requirement for refugees. A second 
would be to reduce the mandatory advertising pe-
riod. Either change would give employers faster ac-
cess to refugee-workers.
Another measure that might 
have a similar effect would be 
to lower the administrative fees 
employers must pay when ap-
plying for a work permit for a 
migrant worker. In many coun-
tries these fees are considerable, 
making them one of the factors 
that discourage employers from 
recruiting migrants.
Some economists have suggested that allowing 
employers to pay refugees who are already in high-
income countries less than the minimum wage 
would help facilitate the integration of refugees 
into the local economy. An equivalent policy ap-
plied to a labor immigration program would allow 
employers to hire refugee-workers on employment 
contracts offering less than the minimum wage, or 
less than the “prevailing wage” mandated by many 
existing programs. Alternatively, the social insur-
ance contributions required of employers could be 
lowered for those hiring refugee-workers.
Reducing employment costs for refugee-workers 
would undoubtedly increase employer demand for 
such workers, but it could also undercut domestic 
workers who might be replaced with cheaper refu-
gees. That would pose the danger of undermining 
political support for the policy in the host country. 
So I oppose using lower employment costs as a way 
of encouraging employers to hire refugee-workers. 
Instead, refugee-workers could be given the same 
(or at least similar) labor and welfare rights as 
those given to other migrant workers admitted un-
der existing labor immigration policies, with the 
possible exception of claiming asylum. 
Overall, this second policy option would likely 
result in larger numbers of refugees being admit-
ted as workers to high-income countries. Its fea-
sibility would depend on public acceptance of the 
humanitarian dimensions of the policy, to justify 
and maintain support for the relaxation of some 
restrictions specifically for refugee-workers. Policy 
makers would need to highlight the positive eco-
nomic contribution that refugees can make to the 
host country, while emphasizing the special regu-
latory requirements of this type of “mixed motives 
migration.” Realistically, under any of the policies 
outlined above, the number of refugee-workers 
would need to be capped in order to address likely 
concerns about uncontrolled immigration of refu-
gees allowed to enter under laxer regulations than 
those applied to other migrant workers.
TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS
The third and most ambi-
tious option for creating a legal 
work-based pathway to high-
income countries for refugees 
would be to establish new tem-
porary labor migration pro-
grams (TMPs) specifically for 
displaced people who are cur-
rently in first countries of asylum in conflict re-
gions. While the specific design of such programs 
might vary, the fundamental questions and chal-
lenges that they would raise are common to all 
countries.
To be politically and economically accept-
able, the numbers admitted through a new TMP 
for refugees would almost certainly need to be 
capped or at least tightly regulated. The program 
might start with a relatively small pilot that could 
be scaled up based on early results. The eventual 
size of the program would largely depend on an 
assessment of the host country’s demand for mi-
grant labor.
From the host country’s perspective, one of the 
most important selection criteria would be the 
skill level of migrants. The specific levels and types 
of skills targeted would be determined mainly by 
demand. But identifying and assessing the magni-
tude of labor and skills shortages in particular sec-
tors and occupations, and deciding whether more 
migration is the best policy response, are typically 
highly contested issues.
Humanitarian considerations  
typically play no role in the  
labor immigration policies  
of high-income countries.
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All TMPs, especially those designed to help fill 
low-skilled jobs, tend to result in segmentation of 
the labor market, which can have adverse conse-
quences for domestic workers. Temporary migra-
tion programs frequently aim to help fill what are 
expected to be temporary shortages. However, 
they often lead to the permanent entrenchment of 
shortages, partly through discouraging hiring of 
domestic workers, and result in a structural de-
mand for migrant labor.
While this may not always be undesirable from 
the host country’s point of view, it can lead to the 
crowding out of at least some domestic workers 
and to the development of employer preferences 
for particular types of migrant workers. With this 
in mind, it may be most realistic to reserve the in-
troduction of new TMPs for refugee-workers for 
sectors and occupations with relatively few com-
peting domestic workers, and where migrants 
already constitute a relatively large share of the 
workforce.
For this reason, the Persian Gulf states would 
arguably find it easier to 
admit large numbers of 
refugee-workers than most 
other high-income countries. 
They are already large-scale 
importers of migrant work-
ers, with segments of the 
labor market staffed mainly 
by migrants. This means that that there are many 
occupations where citizens are not competing for 
jobs. Given their highly segmented labor markets, 
the Gulf states could admit considerable numbers 
of refugee-workers without having to make funda-
mental changes to their existing labor immigration 
policies. The migration researcher Katy Long ob-
served in the late 2000s that many refugees from 
countries like Afghanistan and Somalia had found 
de facto protection through becoming temporary 
workers in the Middle East.
To avoid undercutting prevailing employment 
conditions, refugee-workers should be given the 
same employment rights as domestic workers, or 
at least very similar ones. An important exception 
is the right to free choice of employment. This 
would need to be restricted to enable host coun-
tries to use migrants to address shortages in spe-
cific occupations or sectors.
To accommodate concerns about the net fiscal 
impacts of immigration, many high-income coun-
tries are likely to admit refugee-workers only if 
some of their social rights (such as access to cer-
tain means-tested benefits) could be restricted, at 
least temporarily. In most such countries, restric-
tions on some welfare rights of new labor migrants 
are standard practice. Since refugee-workers are a 
particularly vulnerable group, however, such re-
strictions should be kept to a minimum to ensure 
that have good access to all the health, education, 
and other public services that they and their fami-
lies need, especially for children.
Most temporary labor migration programs, es-
pecially those for lower-skilled workers, restrict 
migrants’ rights to family reunion in one way or 
another. But it is difficult to see how admitting 
refugee-workers without granting them the right 
to bring at least some family members would pro-
vide the minimum degree of effective protection 
that most refugee families seek (though it would 
obviously be less of a concern for single refugees 
without families). In my view, at least some right 
to reunion (if only for core family members) 
would have to be an integral part of the policy. If 
this right does not already exist under an existing 
labor immigration program, 
a policy adjustment could be 
made for refugee-workers.
Depending on their eco-
nomic models and circum-
stances, high-income coun-
tries may wish to impose 
slightly different selection 
criteria with regard to skills, occupations, and na-
tionality, which could be facilitated by bilateral 
agreements. This raises the question of who will 
negotiate agreements and implement policies on 
behalf of refugee-workers. For obvious reasons, 
refugees’ countries of origin cannot play this role. 
First countries of asylum in the region arguably 
are also unlikely to be effective advocates for refu-
gees who wish to participate in labor immigration 
programs in high-income countries. Many will be 
under considerable pressure to negotiate such op-
portunities for their own citizens.
It may be possible for high-income countries to 
establish recruitment offices in countries of first 
asylum (as many European countries did when 
recruiting guest workers during the 1960s and 
1970s). But it would likely be more effective and 
efficient to leave this job to international agencies 
such as the International Organization for Migra-
tion, UNHCR, and the International Labor Orga-
nization. In any case, to make temporary work 
programs for refugees viable, there is a need for 
a stable and reliable organization in refugees’ cur-
Refugee-workers will be  
competing with migrant workers 
from around the world.
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rent country of residence to negotiate and admin-
ister the program in the sending region.
RETURN AND ASYLUM
One of the most difficult challenges raised by 
admitting migrant workers on a temporary basis is 
how to ensure that those whose temporary work 
permits have expired and who have not been able 
to attain permanent residence status return to their 
home countries. While some TMPs have achieved 
high return rates, many others have been charac-
terized by considerable degrees of illegal overstay-
ing—one of the points frequently used by critics 
to argue against such programs. The question of 
whether and how to organize returns is even more 
difficult for TMPs that are specifically designed for 
refugee-workers.
Most importantly, to what country should 
refugee-workers be returned? The most realistic 
option would be to negotiate a return and readmis-
sion agreement with the country of residence—the 
first country of asylum—before refugees join the 
temporary labor migration program. Successfully 
negotiating such an agreement is likely to be a 
major but perhaps not insurmountable challenge. 
Most first countries of asylum are low- and lower-
middle-income countries themselves. It is likely 
that they will accept readmission agreements that 
involve the return of refugees only in exchange 
for greater opportunities for their own nationals 
to gain admission to higher-income countries as 
workers, students, or family migrants.
There are a number of other questions related 
to the modalities and enforcement of return. What 
if refugees whose temporary permits have expired 
refuse to return? Who will cover the costs? What 
status will refugees have after they return to the 
country of first asylum? What kind of employ-
ment, if any, would they find upon their return 
and what support would they need to find a job?
Another key question is whether refugees who 
have entered and reside in high-income countries 
under a labor immigration program should be al-
lowed to change their status, for example to claim 
asylum. Most advocates of alternative pathways 
for refugees emphasize the importance of retain-
ing their right to protection. But it is clear that the 
prospect of refugees using these alternative path-
ways to claim asylum would, in all likelihood, be 
a major disincentive for high-income countries to 
offer such pathways in the first place. They would 
surely want to avoid a situation in which refugees 
use a temporary labor immigration route to enter 
legally and then immediately (or after a brief inter-
val) invoke their right to asylum to stay. 
In theory, there are different ways in which 
refugees could be required to forfeit their right to 
claim asylum after admission to a high-income 
country under an alternative program. One option 
would be to deny that right to anyone who has 
entered via a labor immigration pathway. But this 
immediately raises the question of the right to be 
readmitted to the country of first asylum. Alterna-
tively, high-income countries could stipulate that 
refugees entering under labor immigration pro-
grams cannot claim asylum (or otherwise switch 
categories) until their work permit or other per-
mission to stay expires.
Both of these policies would likely violate exist-
ing international asylum laws and norms. But the 
latter policy of allowing migrants to claim asylum 
only at the end of their stay under a work program 
is arguably more realistic because it would come 
closer to complying with the principle of non-
refoulement (not returning refugees to a country 
where they may face serious danger and harm) 
and other international norms on protection.
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY
Any serious effort to help refugees around the 
world must include new policies that ease the 
pressures on the leading host countries, most of 
which are in low-income regions. High-income 
countries will need to support these policies with 
large increases in financial and other types of assis-
tance as well as a range of measures to promote the 
welfare and labor market integration of refugees 
in countries of first asylum—especially those who 
have no realistic near-term prospect of returning 
safely to their home countries.
There are different ways of sharing responsibil-
ity among nation-states when it comes to the pro-
tection of refugees. The type and form of the con-
tribution each country makes—whether hosting 
refugees, providing financial assistance, or adjust-
ing economic and foreign policies to enable safe 
return—need not be the same for all countries.
Nevertheless, creating and maintaining legal 
pathways to protection in high-income countries 
is of fundamental importance to building a more 
equitable, effective, and sustainable system of 
global refugee protection. Rich countries should 
not be able to simply buy their way out of refugee 
protection at home. This sounds like a fairly ba-
sic and uncontroversial point, but in recent years 
it has been increasingly and openly challenged by 
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more and more political parties and other influen-
tial voices in high-income countries.
Given the limited and currently declining num-
ber of resettlement options available to refugees in 
first countries of asylum, it is time to consider the 
desirability and feasibility of providing refugees 
with labor migration pathways and other alter-
native legal routes to high-income countries. But 
any new policy ideas and proposals for refugee-
workers should reflect the current realities of labor 
immigration policies in such countries. In light of 
the constraints and obstacles I have discussed, it 
is also important to recognize that labor migration 
is unlikely to become a major alternative pathway 
for large numbers of refugees.
However, there are opportunities for designing 
innovative policies that could be attractive both to 
refugees in low-income countries of first asylum 
and to employers and governments in some high-
income countries. New policy designs will need to 
have an explicit dual purpose, combining the ob-
jectives of labor migration and humanitarian pro-
tection. This will inevitably involve at least some 
trade-offs between admission for refugee-workers 
and compliance with some of the protection prin-
ciples enshrined in international asylum and refu-
gee norms.
There are also considerable dangers of instru-
mentalizing refugees, in the sense of creating new 
policies that make the admission of refugees to 
high-income countries dependent, at least par-
tially, on their perceived economic usefulness. 
For most refugees in first countries of asylum, the 
main legal pathway to protection in high-income 
countries should be resettlement. The key political 
challenge remains how to convince rich countries 
to radically increase the resettlement of refugees 
from overburdened lower-income countries. ■
